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Federal Income Taxation
by Nikolai Karetnyi*
and Ruoxi Zhang**
In the year 2019, the federal courts within the Eleventh Circuit
handed down several notable opinions on federal tax issues. 1 This
Article surveys two of those opinions involving the taxation of
shareholder loans to S corporations and the application of gross
valuation-misstatement penalty to partnerships.
I. MERUELO V. COMMISSIONER
The S corporation regime, instituted by Subchapter S of Chapter 1 of
the Internal Revenue Code (the Code),2 allows certain electing "small
business corporations" to pass corporate income, losses, deductions, and
credits through to their shareholders for federal income tax purposes. 3
This permits qualifying S corporations to fuse the advantages of the
legal treatment afforded to corporations under state law with the
benefits of partnership flow-through taxation. A particular advantage is
that an S corporation shareholder may deduct its pro rata share of the S
corporation's losses.4 As with partnerships, this flow-through treatment
also necessitates close scrutiny of dealings between S corporations and
their shareholders to prevent potential abuses of the S corporation
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* Associate in the firm of King & Spalding, New York, New York. Georgetown
University (A.B., 2009); University of Michigan Law School (J.D., 2013); New York
University School of Law (L.L.M., 2015). Member, State Bar of New York.
** Associate in the firm of King & Spalding, New York, New York. Cornell University
(A.B., 2015); New York University School of Law (J.D., 2019). Member, State Bar of New
York.
1. For an analysis of federal income taxation during the prior survey period, see
Gregory S. Lucas & Nikolai Karetnyi, Federal Income Taxation, Eleventh Circuit Survey,
70 MERCER L. REV. 1037 (2019).
2. I.R.C. §§ 1361–1379 (2020).
3. For 2019, the top marginal tax rate for ordinary income was 37%. I.R.C. §§ 1(a)–
(d) (2020).
4. I.R.C. §§ 1366(a), (d) (2020).

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 68 Side B

05/29/2020 07:30:56

[7] FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION CP (DO NOT DELETE)

1038

MERCER LAW REVIEW

5/20/2020 8:30 AM

[Vol. 71

Id.
Treas. Regs. § 1.1366-2(a)(2) (2020).
923 F.3d 938 (11th Cir. 2019).
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regime's benefits. Such safeguard limits a shareholder's ability to
deduct the S corporation's losses to the extent of its adjusted basis in
the stock of the S corporation and the adjusted basis of any
indebtedness of the S corporation owed to such shareholder. 5 This
safeguard is further strengthened by Treasury Regulations section
1.366-2(a)(2) (as amended in 2014) specifying that only "bona fide
indebtedness of the S corporation that runs directly to the shareholder"
can give rise to such basis.6 In Meruelo v. Commissioner,7 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit tackled these rules and
examined whether a complex web of transfers between an S
corporation, its shareholder, and several other affiliated S corporations
resulted in bona fide indebtedness that ran directly to the shareholder,
ultimately affirming the Tax Court's decision to partly disallow the
shareholder's claimed deductions stemming from these loans. 8
Homero Meruelo (Meruelo), a Florida real estate developer,
conducted his business through a bevy of S corporations, partnerships,
and limited liability companies. One of these entities was Merco of Palm
Beaches, Inc. (Merco), an S corporation incorporated in 2004 in which
Meruelo held 49% of the stock. Merco was initially formed to purchase a
South Florida condominium complex in a bankruptcy sale. The
bankruptcy court approved the sale and required Merco to pay a $10
million non-refundable deposit to secure the property.9 Meruelo
financed his share of the deposit by obtaining a personal loan. Meruelo
then transferred $4,985,035 of the loan proceeds to Merco Group at
Akoya, Inc. (Akoya), an S corporation where each of Meruelo and his
mother owned 50% of the stock. Akoya then transferred $5 million into
Merco's escrow account, of which $4,985,035 constituted proceeds from
Meruelo's personal loan and $14,965 constituted Akoya's own funds.
The remaining $5 million of the $10 million deposit was previously
transferred by Akoya to Merco.10
Subsequently, from 2004 to 2008, Merco entered into numerous
transactions with affiliated entities (such as partnerships and other S
corporations) in which Meruelo held an equity interest. Aiming to
simplify accounting practices and enhance liquidity, these affiliated
entities often paid expenses on behalf of each other or Merco. Typically,
these payments were recorded by the payor entity as accounts
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receivable, whereas the payee entity recorded them as accounts
payable. During this time, affiliated entities paid more than $15 million
on behalf of Merco, with Merco repaying its affiliates less than $6
million. On its tax returns, Merco netted its accounts receivable and
payable from its affiliates. If Merco had net accounts payable, then this
amount was reported as a "shareholder loan" on its tax return, and a
percentage of this indebtedness was subsequently allocated to Meruelo
based on his interest in the affiliated entities that had transferred
funds to Merco.11
In connection with the purchase of the condominium complex in
2004, Meruelo granted to Merco a promissory note making available a
$10 million unsecured line of credit at a 6% interest rate. Merco's tax
returns from 2004 to 2008 included an annual charge to this line of
credit equal to Meruelo's calculated share of Merco's net accounts
payable to its affiliates for the preceding taxable year.12
In 2008, banks foreclosed on the condominium complex causing
Merco to incur a loss of $26,605,840. Meruelo was allocated 49% of this
loss ($13,036,861), which he took as an ordinary deduction on his 2008
tax return. Meruelo reported a net operating loss of $11,793,865
(accounting for other income and deductions) on his 2008 tax return. In
2009, Meruelo was granted a refund to carry back these net operating
losses to 2005, thereby reducing his tax liability for 2005 by
$3,897,470.13
In examining Meruelo's tax returns from 2005 through 2008, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) disallowed $8,051,826 of the carried
back net operating losses for lack of sufficient basis and sent Meruelo a
notice of deficiency for 2005. The IRS limited Meruelo's basis in the
Merco stock to the $4,985,035 of the proceeds of the bank loan
contributed by Meruelo through Akoya.14
In response, Meruelo petitioned the Tax Court for redetermination of
the IRS's alleged tax deficiency. Meruelo argued that he possessed
sufficient basis in Merco stock to fully deduct his share of Merco's
losses. In Meruelo's view, his basis in Merco stock consisted of (1) $2.7
million of the first $5 million Akoya deposit; (2) the entirety of Akoya's
second $5 million deposit; and (3) his $6,616,857 share of the
intercompany transfers. Meruelo's argument was predicated upon two
theories, each purportedly establishing that the transfers from the
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15. Id. at 941–42.
16. Id. at 942. See Meruelo v. Comm'r, 115 T.C.M. (CCH) 1060(2018).
17. Treas. Regs. § 1.1366-2(a)(2)(iii), Example (2) (2020).
18. Meruelo, 923 F.3d at 942. See Meruelo, 115 T.C.M. (CCH) 1060.
19. Broz v. Comm'r, 727 F.3d 621, 627–28 (6th Cir. 2013).
20. Meruelo, 115 T.C.M. (CCH) 1060, at *6.
21. Id. at *9.
22. Meruelo, 923 F.3d at 942.
23. Treas. Regs. § 1.1366-2(a) was amended in 2014 to limit debt basis to "bona fide
indebtedness of the S corporation that runs directly to the shareholder." This Treasury
Regulation with respect to debt between an S corporation and its shareholder occurring in
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affiliated entities to Merco were shareholder loans from Meruelo to
Merco.15
Under the first "back-to-back loan" theory, Meruelo argued that the
affiliated companies should have been treated as lending him funds
that he then lent back to Merco.16 Based on an example in the Treasury
Regulations, where both of the back-to-back loans constitute bona fide
indebtedness that run directly to the applicable creditor, the debt from
the first shareholder creditor to the ultimate S corporation debtor would
constitute a shareholder loan (effectively disregarding the intermediate
debtor/creditor S corporation).17
Under the second "incorporated pocketbook theory," Meruelo
contended that because the affiliated companies were a mere conduit
for paying Merco's expenses on his behalf, Meruelo should be treated as
directly making these payments to Merco. 18 This theory concludes that
a "taxpayer can obtain debt basis in an S corporation through payments
made by a wholly owned corporate entity if that entity functions as the
shareholder's 'incorporate pocketbook,' meaning that the taxpayer has a
'habitual practice of having his wholly owned corporation pay money to
third parties on his behalf.'"19
The Tax Court dismissed both of Meruelo's arguments and ruled for
the IRS, determining that Meruelo was not entitled to any of the
$8,051,826 of the disputed basis in Merco stock. 20 In reaching this
conclusion, the Tax Court reiterated that a shareholder may increase
his basis in S corporation stock by the amount of the adjusted basis of
any indebtedness owed by the S corporation to the shareholder. 21 After
assessing earlier decisions and legislative history, the Tax Court
further asserted that in order to increase basis, the loan requires an
"actual economic outlay" by the shareholder. That is, the shareholder
must demonstrate that "he incurred a cost in making a loan or that he
was left poorer in a material sense after the transaction." 22 The Tax
Court interpreted Treasury Regulations section 1.1366-2(a)(2)23
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a year that was still open for assessment on July 23, 2014. See Treas. Regs. § 1.1366-5(b)
(2020).
24. T.D. 9682, 2014-2 C.B. 342 (July 23, 2014).
25. Meruelo, 115 T.C.M. (CCH) 1060, at *13–17.
26. Id. at *16.
27. Meruelo, 923 F.3d at 942–43; see Meruelo, 115 T.C.M. (CCH) 1060, at *16.
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(amended in 2014 to limit debt basis to "bona fide indebtedness of the S
corporation that runs directly to the shareholder") as essentially
codifying the "actual economic outlay" doctrine and requiring a
shareholder to prove that an S corporation's indebtedness ran directly
to him in order to deduct his proportionate share of the S corporation's
net operating loss. This sweeping interpretation has proven to be
controversial as the preamble to the final Treasury Regulations
promulgating Treasury Regulations section 1.1366-2(a)(2) instructed
that the new "bona fide" standard was meant to provide a new test for
courts "[i]nstead of applying the actual economic outlay standard." 24
The Tax Court first rejected Meruelo's back-to-back loan theory on
formalistic grounds, finding that there was no evidence that the funds
were first lent to Meruelo and then lent back to Merco. 25 Bona fide
back-to-back loans (from an affiliated company to a shareholder and
then from the shareholder to an S corporations) can increase a
shareholder's basis in S corporation stock. However, the Tax Court also
noted that shareholders are bound by the form of the loan transactions
initially chosen and cannot simply reclassify transactions directly
between affiliated companies (especially when such transactions do not
involve the shareholder) as back-to-back loans for tax purposes. As a
result, because the Merco affiliates did not initially treat the
transactions amongst themselves as shareholder loans, the Tax Court
reasoned that such treatment would be inappropriate in this instance.
Rather, these transactions were initially labelled as accounts receivable
and payable, wage payments, or capital contributions, and then
subsequently re-labelled as shareholder loans on Meruelo's tax
returns.26 The Tax Court also incorporated the actual economic outlay
doctrine into its analysis because per Treasury Regulations
section 1.1366-2(a)(2), "bona fide indebtedness" is determined by
"general Federal tax principles," which, in the Tax Court's view,
includes the actual economic outlay doctrine. Here, Meruelo incurred no
costs with respect to the monetary transfers from the Merco affiliates to
Merco, and thus "could not claim that these transfers amounted to a
shareholder loan."27 Arguably, this broad interpretation of the "bona
fide" standard explicitly ignored the mandate in the preamble to the
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Meruelo, 115 T.C.M. (CCH) 1060, at *19.
Meruelo, 923 F.3d at 940.
Id.
Id. at 944.
Id.
Id. at 945.
Id. at 944.
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final Treasury Regulations and resulted in an unfavorable result for S
corporation shareholders.
Meruelo's incorporated pocketbook theory was likewise rejected by
the Tax Court. The Tax Court distinguished its earlier rulings
upholding the incorporated pocketbook theory by emphasizing that in
these cases a taxpayer habitually used a single wholly-owned
corporation to pay third parties on his behalf. In Meruelo's case, the Tax
Court observed that the Merco affiliates had co-owners other than
Meruelo, did not "habitually" pay Meruelo's expenses, and did not
contemporaneously book the transfers as shareholder loans. 28
Upon appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, Meruelo claimed that the Tax
Court erred in disallowing his deduction and that Merco's bona fide
indebtedness ran directly to him under the back-to-back loans and
unincorporated pocketbook theories. 29 Reviewing Meruelo's arguments
de novo, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed the Tax Court's finding that
these claims failed to establish that Merco's debt ran directly to
Meruelo and thus could not be treated as shareholder loans giving rise
to basis in Merco stock.30
The Eleventh Circuit rejected Meruelo's back-to-back loan theory on
the dual basis that the Merco's debt never ran directly to Meruelo, both
in substance and in form.31 Citing the example in the Treasury
Regulations, the Eleventh Circuit recognized the legitimacy of the
theory where both back-to-back loans constitute bona fide indebtedness
and run directly to the applicable creditor. 32 However, Meruelo's alleged
back-to-back loans to Merco through its affiliates failed to clear this
hurdle, even if a portion of the funds transferred to Merco through its
affiliates could be considered (as argued by Meruelo) profits that
Meruelo would be entitled to receive or otherwise pay Merco's business
expenses.33 First, the Eleventh Circuit deferred to long-standing
Supreme Court precedent leaving taxpayers bound by the form of their
transaction and liable for its ultimate consequences, regardless of
whether the taxpayers believe that the "economic substance" of the
transaction triggers different tax consequences. 34 In doing so, the
Eleventh Circuit rejected Meruelo's claims that the back-to-back loans
from Meruelo to the Merco affiliates and then to Merco were "in
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35. Id. at 944–45.
36. Id. See Selfe v. United States, 778 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1985).
37. Meruelo, 923 F.3d at 945.
38. Id. at 945–46.
39. Id. at 946.
40. Id. See Broz, 727 F.3d at 628 (affirming Tax Court's rejection of taxpayers'
"incorporated pocketbook" argument where the taxpayers failed to establish that they
habitually paid third parties through the entities); Messina v. Comm'r, 114 T.C.M. (CCH)
477, at *32–33 (2017) (rejecting theory on the same ground); Ruckriegel v. Comm'r, 91
T.C.M. (CCH) 1035 [2006 RIA T.C.M. 2006-078] (same).
41. Meruelo, 923 F.3d at 946.
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substance" direct loans from Meruelo to Merco.35 Meruelo further
argued, based on a single Eleventh Circuit decision, that an exceptional
circumstance could warrant assessing a transaction's substance instead
of its form to determine tax consequences.36 But the Eleventh Circuit
distinguished this decision, noting that genuine issues of material fact
existed as to whether a loan to an S corporation guaranteed by its
shareholder's assets ran directly to the shareholder, and held that no
such exceptional circumstances occurred in Meruelo's case to justify
deferring to the substance of the transaction. 37 Second, Meruelo's
reclassification of the intercompany transfers on his tax returns and
annual adjustments to the line-of-credit the 2004 promissory note were
insufficient to establish that, in form, these transfers were back-to-back
loans. These transfers were contemporaneously classified as between
Merco and its affiliates and thus the end-of-year re-designation of the
transfers as shareholder loans on Meruelo's tax returns could not
govern. Moreover, the uniform annual adjustments to the "notional line
of credit" established by the 2004 promissory note could not create
actual indebtedness to Meruelo.38
Similarly, Meruelo's invocation of the incorporated pocketbook theory
failed to persuade the Eleventh Circuit that the Merco affiliates served
as Meruelo's incorporated pocketbook.39 The Eleventh Circuit
distinguished Tax Court cases upholding this theory by observing that
the shareholders in question routinely used a single wholly-owned
entity to make payments on their behalf. 40 In contrast, Meruelo used a
multitude of distinct Merco affiliates, most of which were only partially
owned by Meruelo, as his incorporated pocketbook. The Merco affiliates
also acted more like ordinary businesses by disbursing and receiving
funds for Merco's business expenses. As explained by the Tax Court and
reaffirmed by the Eleventh Circuit, "no court has ever ruled that a
group of non-wholly owned entities that both receive and disburse funds
in this fashion can constitute an incorporated pocketbook." 41 Moreover,
considering that these entities also paid the expenses of other Merco
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affiliates, Meruelo failed to establish that they habitually paid his
personal expenses.42
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Meruelo does not support the
integration of the actual economic outlay doctrine with the
requirements of Treasury Regulations § 1.1366-2(a)(2). The Eleventh
Circuit only discussed the actual economic outlay doctrine with respect
to the Tax Court's earlier decision, but did not directly reference the
doctrine in its analysis of the merits of Meruelo's appeal. The Eleventh
Circuit sidestepped discussion of the economic outlay doctrine in favor
of emphasizing the formal classification of the loans, as Meruelo's
failure to contemporaneously and consistently document the
transactions as shareholder loans was a key point in the Eleventh
Circuit's dismissal of his back-to-back loan and incorporated pocketbook
theories. The Eleventh Circuit's reluctance to clash with the Tax Court
on the application of the actual economic outlay doctrine, combined with
its divergent focus on formalism with regard to loan documentation,
does not provide taxpayers embroiled in complicated S corporation
structures with a clear framework for determining basis attributable to
shareholder loans by leaving the question of whether the actual
economic outlay doctrine applies unanswered.
II. HIGHPOINT TOWER TECH. INC. V. COMMISSIONER

05/29/2020 07:30:56

42. Id.
43. 931 F.3d 1050 (11th Cir. 2019).
44. Id. at 1065.
45. Id. at 1052. With variance, this type of tax shelter is known as "Son-of-Boss." See,
e.g., Petaluma FX Partners, LLC v. Comm'r, 591 F.3d 649, 650 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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In Highpoint Tower Technology. Inc. v. Commissioner,43 the Eleventh
Circuit examined the long-standing split of deficiency jurisdiction
amongst the Tax Court and district court through the lens of a gross
valuation-misstatement penalty imposed on a partner of a sham
partnership. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's denial of
Highpoint Tower Tech.'s (Highpoint) Motion to Restrain Collection of
the gross valuation-misstatement penalty on the basis that the penalty
related to an adjustment to a partnership item and was thus excluded
from the Tax Court's deficiency jurisdiction. 44
The Highpoint Tower case involved a tax shelter employing a series
of transactions to create artificial financial losses used to offset real
financial gains.45 In 1999, Highpoint joined Arbitrage Trading, LLC
(Arbitrage) as a partner. In exchange for a membership interest in the
partnership, Highpoint contributed cash and a pair of Euro currency
options. A few months later, Highpoint withdrew from the partnership
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and received a liquidating distribution of the Euros. Because Highpoint
did not include the contributed Euro currency options in its outside
basis as a potential liability, its relatively high outside basis 46 enabled
Highpoint to claim a relatively large capital loss on its 1999 tax return
after selling the Euros.47
In October 2005, the IRS issued a Notice of Final Partnership
Administrative Adjustment (the FPAA Notice) to Arbitrage determining
that Arbitrage lacked economic substance and was a "sham" whose sole
tax avoidance purpose was to allow its purported partners to artificially
overstate their outside basis. The FPAA Notice imposed a 40% penalty
on the portion of any underpayment attributable to the gross valuation
misstatement.48 A gross valuation-misstatement refers to instances
where "the value of any property (or the adjusted basis of any property)
claimed on any return of tax . . . is [400] percent or more of the amount
determined to be the correct amount of such valuation or adjusted
basis."49 A related Treasury Regulation further provides that "[t]he
value or adjusted basis claimed on a return of any property with a
correct value or adjusted basis of zero is considered to be 400 percent or
more of the correct amount."50 Since the IRS determined that Arbitrage
lacked economic substance, the correct value or adjusted basis on tax
returns in connection with its property and related transactions would
be zero and, therefore, the applicable penalty rate would be 40%.
Highpoint, as a partner of Arbitrage, received the IRS-issued Notice of
Deficiency which imposed the gross valuation-misstatement penalty.51
Highpoint filed a petition in the Tax Court for redetermination of its
deficiency in February 2016. Only a few days after Highpoint's filing,
the IRS issued to Highpoint a Notice of Tax Due for the same amount
42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 72 Side A
05/29/2020 07:30:56

46. A partner's outside basis is its basis in a partnership interest. It is used to
determine gain and loss when the partner sells his/her interest. Distributions and
liabilities will decrease a partner's outside basis. The outside basis cannot go below zero.
If any distribution or allocation is larger than the partner's outside basis, the partner will
recognize gain; conversely, if the distribution a partner receives at distribution is less
than his/her outside basis, the partner will realize losses. Therefore, having a large
outside basis is advantageous for partners in partnerships to shield themselves from
realizing any gain. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 705, 752 (2020); Treas. Regs. §§ 1.705-1, 1.752-1
(2020) (discussing effects of partner and partnership liabilities on a partner's outside
basis).
47. Highpoint Tower Tech., 931 F.3d at 1053.
48. Id. at 1054.
49. Gustashaw v. Comm'r, 696 F.3d 1124, 1135 (11th Cir. 2012).
50. Treas. Regs. § 1.6662-5(g) (2020).
51. Because Arbitrage was an LLC, which is a flow-through entity (unless it makes a
valid election to be treated otherwise), all entity-level federal income taxes (and penalties)
may be reported and eventually borne by its members.
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52. Highpoint Tower Tech., 931 F.3d at 1055.
53. See 13 MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 49C:1 (2019) "Upon receipt
of a notice of deficiency, a taxpayer may either file a petition with the Tax Court to
contest the amount of the deficiency or pay the amount of the deficiency and sue for a
refund in either the Claims Court or the appropriate District Court."; See generally
UNITED STATES TAX COURT, RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (2012); I.R.M. 34.5.2
(2012).
54. The rest of the deficiency amount (i.e., the amount not relating to the
partnership-level gross valuation-misstatement penalty) was not discussed because both
parties agreed that the Tax Court had jurisdiction over adjustments relating to capital
gains income and the professional fee deductions. Highpoint Tower Tech., 931 F.3d at
1055.
55. Id. at 1055–56.

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 72 Side B

stated in the Notice of Deficiency. In June 2016, the IRS notified
Highpoint of the intention to levy its property to collect the amount due.
Highpoint responded to the potential levy almost immediately by filing
a Motion to Restrain Collection with the Tax Court. 52
The central dispute in Highpoint is whether a taxpayer may
challenge a gross valuation-misstatement penalty (previously
determined to be applicable at the partnership level) in partner-level
tax deficiency proceedings before the Tax Court. As a general matter,
both the Tax Court and district courts have jurisdiction over deficiency
proceedings. The difference is that in Tax Court deficiency proceedings,
taxpayers are not required to pay the tax deficiency until the final
amount is determined by the Tax Court; whereas filing a petition in
district court requires taxpayers to first pay the amount due, and, if it is
ultimately determined that the IRS has erred in its determination,
receive refund for overpayment later. 53 In other words, Highpoint
presents a dispute as to whether the Tax Court, in partner-level
deficiency proceedings, has jurisdiction over the penalty for gross
valuation-misstatement previously assessed at the partnership level. 54
The IRS objected to Highpoint's Motion to Restrain Collection and
moved to dismiss the portions of the case relating to the adjustment to
other income and the valuation-misstatement penalty. In July 2017, the
Tax Court denied Highpoint's Motion to Restrain Collection to the
extent it related to the penalty. In August 2017, Highpoint filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Tax Court's order. Finally, in
November 2017, the Tax Court denied Highpoint's Motion for
Reconsideration and granted the IRS's motion to dismiss in full. 55
The relevant issue for the Eleventh Circuit's review was whether the
Tax Court erred in holding that it lacked deficiency jurisdiction over the
gross valuation-misstatement penalty and in turn erred in denying the
Highpoint's Motion to Restrain Collection of the penalty. The Eleventh
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Id. at 1056.
Id. at 1057.
Id. at 1059.
571 U.S. 31 (2013).
Highpoint Tower Tech., 931 F.3d at 1058.
Woods, 571 U.S. at 37.
Highpoint Tower Tech., 931 F.3d at 1061–62.
Id. at 1062.
Id. at 1058–59.
I.R.C. §§ 6230(a)(1)–(3) (repealed 2017).
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Circuit examined the issue on two levels.56 First, the Eleventh Circuit
analyzed whether the gross valuation-misstatement penalty asserted
against Highpoint was applicable if it was determined that the
Arbitrage partnership was a sham and therefor did not exist for tax
purposes.57 Second, the Eleventh Circuit assessed whether the gross
valuation-misstatement penalty related to an adjustment to a
"partnership item" that falls outside of the Tax Court's deficiency
jurisdiction.58
The first part of the Eleventh Circuit's analysis was relatively
straightforward. On whether the gross valuation-misstatement penalty
applied to Highpoint's transactions, the Eleventh Circuit analogized the
facts with United States v. Woods,59 another tax shelter case.60 Even
though the Woods case involved a different type of tax shelter, the
result was similar because the underlying transaction (and partnership)
was disregarded for lack of economic substance. 61 The Eleventh Circuit
accepted the Woods analysis that there is no dispute that a
determination of a partnership lacking economic substance is grounds
for applying the gross valuation-misstatement penalty.62 Both the
Woods court and the Eleventh Circuit also agreed with the
government's position in Woods that "[b]ecause there can be no outside
basis in a sham partnership . . . any partner who reports an outside
basis greater than zero commits a valuation misstatement."63
The second part of the Eleventh Circuit's analysis was more nuanced.
To determine whether the Tax Court possessed deficiency jurisdiction
over the valuation-misstatement penalty, the Eleventh Circuit first
performed a statutory analysis by looking to the Code and related
Treasury Regulations.64 Code section 6230(a)(1) provides that Tax
Court deficiency proceedings do not "apply to the assessment or
collection of any computational adjustment," unless either
section 6230(a)(2) or (a)(3) provides otherwise.65 Under section
6231(a)(6), a "computational adjustment" is defined as "the change in
the tax liability of a partner which properly reflects the treatment . . . of
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66. I.R.C. § 6231(a)(6) (2012) (repealed 2017).
67. I.R.C. § 6231(a)(3) (2012) (amended 2017).
68. Highpoint Tower Tech., 931 F.3d at 1057–58.
69. Id. at 1059.
70. Id. at 1058–59 (quoting I.R.C. § 6230(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012) (repealed 2017)).
71. Id. at 1058 (quoting I.R.C. § 6231(a)(5) (repealed 2017)). An "affected item" is
defined as "any item to the extent such item is affected by a partnership item."
72. Highpoint Tower Tech., 931 F.3d at 1058 (emphasis added). See also Treas. Reg.
§ 301.6231(a)(3)-1(b).
73. Accord, e.g., Woods, 571 U.S. at 39–44.
74. Highpoint Tower Tech., 931 F.3d at 1058. See also Treas. Reg.
§ 301.6231(a)(3)-1(b).
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a partnership item. All adjustments required to apply the results of a
proceeding with respect to a partnership . . . to an indirect partner shall
be treated as computational adjustments." 66 Consequently, a
"partnership item" is defined as "any item required to be taken into
account for the partnership's taxable year . . . to the extent . . . such
item is more appropriately determined at the partnership level than at
the partner level."67 Considering these statutory definitions in tandem,
if a change in the tax liability of a partner reflects the treatment of an
underlying partnership item, then the Tax Court's "deficiency
proceedings will not apply to the assessment of that adjustment unless
otherwise provided for in [Code section] 6230(a)(2) or (a)(3)."68 The key
to this part of analysis, then, hinges on the determination of whether
the gross valuation-misstatement penalty at issue relates to an
adjustment to a partnership item.69 Highpoint contended that because
the gross valuation-misstatement penalty was an "affected item[] which
required partner level determinations," 70 it could not simultaneously be
a "penalt[y] . . . that related to adjustments to partnership items."71
However, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the "partnership item"
definition includes "the legal and factual determinations that underlie
the determination of the amount, timing and characterization of items
of income, credit, gain, loss, deduction, etc." 72 Per case law, the
underlying determination that a partnership is a sham plainly falls
within this definition of a partnership item. 73 Therefore, the Eleventh
Circuit sided with the IRS on the characterization of sham transactions
and, as a result, concluded that "[t]he underlying legal determination
that a partnership is a sham lacking economic substance—which
caused the penalty to be applied in this case—falls within this
'partnership items' definition."74 Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit
pointed out that the taxpayer overlooked the plain meaning under the
treasury regulation, which provides that "[c]hanges in a partner's tax
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05/29/2020 07:30:56

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 74 Side A

liability with respect to affected items that require partner level
determinations . . . are computational adjustments . . . ."75
To buttress its position, the Eleventh Circuit again looked to
Woods.76 Although the jurisdictional issue between Woods and
Highpoint was different—the court in Woods considered whether a
district court had partnership-level jurisdiction over a gross
valuation-misstatement penalty, whereas the Eleven Circuit
determined whether the Tax Court had partner-level deficiency
jurisdiction over a gross valuation-misstatement penalty—the penalty
at issue was the same and the Woods line of reasoning was applicable to
Highpoint's facts.77 Most importantly, Woods made clear that even
though penalties may only be logically imposed after partner-level
determinations are made, whether certain penalties apply must be
determined at the partnership level, and that these two seemingly
contrasting approaches are not mutually exclusive. 78 In our view, this is
a crucial conclusion that realistically applies the penalty regime to the
flow-through nature of partnership taxation. Building upon that
concept, the Eleventh Circuit joined the Woods court in rejecting the
taxpayer's position that "a penalty does not relate to a partnership-item
adjustment if it requires a partner-level determination." 79 Therefore,
because Highpoint's gross valuation-misstatement penalty related to
partnership-item adjustment, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the Tax
Court correctly found that it lacked jurisdiction over such
determination.80
Although the Eleventh Circuit's analysis flows from a reasoned
understanding of case law and statutory provisions, broader policy
questions remain as to whether two distinct procedural pathways are
necessary to determine a single taxpayer's deficiency amount, and
whether the statutory lines in the sand between Tax Court and district
court deficiency jurisdiction are arbitrary or instead grounded in
practicality. Highpoint presented its views on these questions, arguing
that by preventing it from addressing the penalty in Tax Court
deficiency proceedings along with determination of other amounts—
"and forcing it to raise challenges to the penalty in refund or Collection
Due Process proceedings instead—is duplicative and contrary to the
congressional intent behind the 1997 amendments to [the Tax Equity
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and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982] that sought to streamline
partnership tax litigation."81 However, because the Eleventh Circuit
found
that
the
statutes
clearly
excluded
the
gross
valuation-misstatement penalty from the Tax Court's deficiency
jurisdiction, there was no need to address the taxpayer's legislative
intent arguments.82 As such, the system apportioning deficiency
jurisdiction between the Tax Court and district courts remains
unchanged over Highpoint's objections. 83
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81. Id. at 1060.
82. Id.
83. See Manroe v. Comm'r, T.C.M. 2020-16, at *15–16 (cited and reaffirmed the
Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Highpoint).

